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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN A TRANSNATIONAL 
WORLD:  THE AMBIGUOUS ROLE OF LAW 
Peer Zumbansen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper originates in part out of diverse legal theoretical enterprises that 
have, under the labels of legal realism, reflexive law, and legal pluralism, 
contributed to a powerful critique of traditional understandings of law and 
have, as such, shaped contemporary legal consciousness. In addition, this 
paper takes its cues from the evolving field of transitional justice, which 
comprises a diverse set of elements including criminal law, law & 
development, the law of occupation and transnational human rights 
litigation. At the intersection of these two, domestically and 
transnationally spirited sets of legal theoretical inquiries, we find a new 
understanding of ‘law in action’. No longer merely the label that points to 
the – disillusioning or uplifting – ‘reality’ of law as compared to the ‘law 
on the books’, but a far-reaching interpenetration of law and non-law. 
Transitional justice can be seen as the sobering moment at which law 
reflects on what it can do, what it is, and what it means. As such 
transitional justice emerges as a somewhat unexpected site where 
conflicting social rationalities test the limits of law in bringing about 
order, guaranteeing peace and sustaining integrity. The transnational 
evidence of reflections on the place of law in addressing past-injustice on 
the one hand and on law’s part in the re-creation of a sustainable social 
and political order for the future on the other, is overwhelming. Ranging 
* Canada Research Chair in the Transnational and Comparative Law of Corporate
Governance, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada. Email: 
PZumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca. Thanks to Scott Veitch and Emilios Christodoulidis for 
helpful comments on this essay and their invitation to the Glasgow Workshop. An earlier 
version of this essay, entitled “Transnational Law and Societal Memory” was published 
in Veitch ed., Law and the Politics of Reconciliation (2007). This paper is part of a larger 
research project on the intersection of law & development and transitional justice. See 
Peer Zumbansen / Ruth Buchanan eds., Law in Transition. Rights, Development and 
Restorative Justice. An Osgoode Reader (forthcoming, 2009). 
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from a fast-growing body of specialized scholarship through Symposia, 
Journals on to Dedicated Research Centres, transitional justice has become 
a focus area of contemporary legal theory and concern. 
What becomes apparent in this context is a distinct field of ‘transnational 
transitional justice’, an approach to understanding law, states and societies 
in transition that allows for a broader and deeper appreciation of the 
different trajectories along which regulatory forms evolve. This 
transnational perspective has for some time now begun to powerfully 
inform work in various areas of law and other social sciences, including 
comparative history. Building on work in post-colonial studies, 
comparative historiography, transfer studies and ‘connected’ or ‘shared’ 
histories, the programs developed under the heading of transnational 
history1 and histoire croisée2 are informed by the same deeper-running 
transformations that have increasingly been plaguing the law in the 
different constellations described above. Globalization and culture are, 
across the board, recognized as the two deconstructivist forces that tear 
down the edifices of territorially defined political spaces. In law, these 
challenges bring about the structural and normative exhaustion of the 
welfare state3 with uncertain outcome for any third-way programs or 
reconsolidation4, in history they demand the reconsideration of national 
histories, of old trajectories now revisited from the perspective of the 
1 See Jürgen Osterhammel, Transnationale Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Erweiterung oder 
Alternative?, 27 GESCHICHTE UND GESELLSCHAFT (2001); Sebastian Conrad/Jürgen 
Osterhammel (Ed.), DAS KAISERREICH TRANSNATIONAL. DEUTSCHLAND IN DER WELT
1871 - 1914, 2004; for critical reflections on this approach, see Hans-Ulrich Wehler, 
Transnationale Geschichte - der neue Königsweg historischer Forschung?, in: 
TRANSNATIONALE GESCHICHTE. THEMEN, TENDENZEN, THEORIEN 161 
(Budde/Conrad/Janz Ed. 2006). 
2 Michael Werner/Bénédicte Zimmermann, Beyond comparison: Histoire croisée and the 
challenge of reflexivity, 45 HISTORY AND THEORY 30 (2006)  
3 Jürgen Habermas, The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the 
Exhaustion of Utopian Energies [1985], in: THE NEW CONSERVATISM. CULTURAL
CRITICISM AND THE HISTORIANS' DEBATE [ed. and transl. by Shierry Weber Nicholsen] 
48 (Habermas Ed. 1989) 
4 Anthony Giddens/Patrick Diamond/Roger Liddle (Ed.), GLOBAL EUROPE, SOCIAL
EUROPE, 2007; see already the concise analysis by Paul Pierson, The New Politics of the 
Welfare State, 48 WORLD POLITICS 143 (1996) 




transnational phenomena that might have shaped them.5 As formulated by 
Michael Geyer, “Transnational historiography […] posits the interstices 
between nations, the quintessential “in-side,” and the world of cross-
border traffic, the quintessential “outside,” as the crucial disjuncture of 
modern times and, hence, considers it to be the main source of change. No 
nation generates modern life from within, although all of them instantly 
historicize and, that is, nationalize modernization (to the ridiculous, but 
telling point that all modern inventions are ascribed to indigenous origins). 
The long and the short of this is that the development of nations is 
predicated on transnational interaction.” To the degree that this approach 
does not simply add ‘another’ history to the already existing and studied 
ones, it aims, much more ambitiously, to present a different national 
history.6 
 
As we try to make sense of changes ‘at home’, these changes attain a 
different meaning when seen in relation to larger processes and 
transformations that can better be ascertained as transnational in nature. 
Asking painful questions then becomes unavoidable: “[…] the bottom line 
of an “entangled history” is that “forces and movements” beyond the 
control of nations interlace the seemingly autonomous unit of the nation, 
define or deny opportunities and options, and create material and cultural 
incentives for locals to act. […].”7 As this debate among historians about 
the merits of a new approach to studying old histories and the solidity of 
the transnational history framework continues to unfold, it suggests that 
attempts among other expert groups, lawyers, sociologists, cultural 
                                                 
5 Jürgen Osterhammel/Niels P. Petersson, Globalization: A Short History (2004); 
Sebastian Conrad/Jürgen Osterhammel (Ed.), Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland 
in der Welt 1871 - 1914, 2004; see also the review by Michael Geyer of the edited 
volume, Transnationale Geschichte, supra note 145, available at: 
http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/type=revsymp&id=812  
6 Geyer, loc. cit. 
7 In this context, see for example, Valerie Hébert, The Politics of Punishment: War 
Criminals and the Struggle for German Reintegration with the West, 1948-1958, in: 
AFTER FASCISM: POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN EUROPE SINCE 1945 
(Maria Mesner & Matt Berg eds., 2008), forthcoming; see the excellent account of the 
socio-political discursive climate during Adenauer’s reign by NORBERT FREI, 
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theorists, exploring the intersections between law & development, 
restorative justice, and the rule of law can, if at all, bear productive 
insights only when and where we accept this overlapping of conceptual 
and disciplinary perspectives as a starting point.  
 
The following observations are made in this light. They pertain to the 
complexity of an emerging conceptual framework that for the time being 
sits strangely within a legal order built on distinctions between the national 
and the international. Transitional justice, against this background, can be 
taken as an invitation to reflect on the dynamic tensions that both uphold 
and constantly question such demarcation lines. 
 
 
II. NEW BEGINNINGS 
 
The “big bang” of military or political revolution that accompanies the 
setting free of powerful dynamics of transition and transformation, of post-
conflict, post-apartheid and post-war justice, has triggered a widespread 
and wide-ranging research agenda around the world that is concerned with 
the chances of a new “beginning” and the need to adequately account for 
legacies and past experiences in the process.8 From post-apartheid South 
Africa9, the East- and West-German narratives of the Nazi past10 and 
Germany’s Reunification11, on to post-genocide Rwanda12 and the 
                                                 
8 Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2000); Teitel, 
“The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice”, (2005) 38 Cornell Int'l L. 
Rev. 837-862; see the contributions in Christodoulidis/Veitch eds., Lethe’s Law: Law and 
Ethics in Reconciliation (Oxford, UK/Portland, OR; Hart Publishing, 2001). 
9 Gross, "Reconciliation in South Africa" (2004) 40 Stanf. J. Int'l L. 40-107. 
10 Herbert/Goehler, Zweierlei Bewältigung. Vier Beiträge über den Umgang mit der 
nationalsozialistischen Vergangenheit in den beiden deutschen Staaten (Hamburg, 
Edition, 1992). 
11 See only Markovits, "Selective Memory: How the Law Affects What We Remember and 
Forget from the Past: The Case of East Germany" (2001) 35 Law and Society Review 
513-563 
12 Mgbako, "Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in 
Post-Genocide Rwanda" (2005) 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal 201-224; Agbakwa, 
"Genocidal Politics and Racialization of Intervention: From Rwanda to Darfur and 




‘transformative occupation’13 of Iraq14, the existing accounts of this 
process challenge our understanding of how to go about the future while 
minding the past. In a crucial way, such fragile and vulnerable societal 
projects challenge the role of law as we learn to recognize its distinct role 
in ascertaining past deeds committed, plights suffered and answers found 
to the often unspeakable events of the past. Importantly, coupled with this 
reconstructive, dialogical dimension of the law’s addressing of the (its) 
past, we find its institutional dimension.15 While the former encompasses 
accountability, reconstruction and ‘truth’, the latter relates to the re-
creation or foundation of democratic institutions, constitutions and the rule 
of law.16 But it is this tension between the allegedly extraordinary status of 
the events on the one hand, and the regular and reliable workings of the 
legal order on the other that informs and structures our approach to 
bringing the law to bear upon these challenges. Is law quiet in states of 
exceptions17, during les heures zero, and at notorious, ‘new beginnings’ 
                                                                                                                         
Beyond" (2005) 6 German Law Journal 513-531, at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol06No02/PDF_Vol_06_No_02_513-
531_Developments_Agbakwa.pdf. 
13 Bhuta, "The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation" (2005) 16 European Journal of 
International Law [EJIL] 721-740 
14 Anderson, The Fall of Bhagdad (2004); Nuri Frame, “One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Back? The Failings of the Iraqi Special Tribunal”, Paper written for the GLOBALIZATION 
AND THE LAW Course at Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, April 2005 (on file with 
author). 
15 Chesterman, You, The People. The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and 
State-Building (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2004), at 154: “One of the 
most important and difficult challenges confronting a post-conflict society is the re-
establishment of faith in the institutions of the state. Respect for the rule of law in 
particular, implying subjugation to consistent and transparent principles under state 
institutions exercising a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, may face special 
obstacles.” 
16 For an excellent overview of the panoply, see Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford/New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2000); see also Chesterman, You, The People. The United 
Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building (Oxford/New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
17 This goes back to Cicero’s oratio pro annio milone, where he states: inter arma silent 
leges. This has found a great renaissance in the wide-spread curtailment of civil rights in 
the international and domestic war on terror. Hereto, e.g., Morgan, "Slaughterhouse Six: 
Updating the Law of War" (2004) 5 German Law Journal 525-544; Scheppele, "Law in a 
 
 
6                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 08 
 
that suggest their apartness from the otherwise silent or violent workings 
of the law?18 New beginnings offer themselves as chances of coinciding 
legality and legitimacy, but the law of new beginnings is in fact tainted 
and burdened by the past experiences of law that question the acceptable 
meaning and substance of the term itself.19 “What is deemed just is 
contingent and informed by prior injustice.”20 
 
This paper wishes to bring to contemporary discussions of post-conflict 
justice and nation-building a uniquely focused perspective. Its basis lies in 
an understanding of the challenges faced by law in different post-conflict 
contexts where law is expected to provide the grounding and starting point 
for national and societal reconstruction. While the distinct experiences that 
we can observe are deeply embedded in particular histories and 
trajectories of countries and peoples, the law’s response has, at least since 
the Nuremberg trials, taken on a wider perspective. Far from suggesting a 
one-size-fits-all answer to the legal void after periods of atrocities and 
human suffering, we can observe the emergence of a transnational law of 
post-conflict justice. It develops from the increasingly shared experiences 
in designing a legal answer in situations of post-conflict reconstruction. 
These situations illustrate the utmost challenge of legally addressing the 
downfall of law, of reliability, and legitimacy. Whether law can at all 
adequately address the absence of (a higher sense of) law ex post, remains 
                                                                                                                         
Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11" (2004) 6 University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 1001-1083; Oliver Lepsius, “The 
Relationship Between Security and Civil Liberties in the Federal Republic of Germany 
after September 11”, in Paul Gewirtz/Jacob Katz Cogan (eds.), Global Constitutionalism: 
Privacy, Proportionality, Terrorism and Civil Liberties (New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 2002), III 7. For its legacies, see only Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters 
on the concept of sovereignty [1922] (transl. George Schwab) (Cambridge, MA, The 
MIT Press, 1986); Koskenniemi, "'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much'. Kosovo, and the 
Turn to Ethics in International Law" (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 159-175. 
18 Hay, "Time, Inequality, and Law's Violence", in Sarat/Kearns (ed) Law's Violence (Ann 
Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1992), 141-173. 
19 Gustav Radbruch, “Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht”, in (1946) 
Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung 105; see hereto the debate between Hart, "Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals" (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593-628, and Fuller, "Fidelity to 
Law - A Reply to Professor Hart" (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630-672. 
20 Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2000), 6. 




a fundamental conundrum no different from the question of how to 
adequately speak of the unspeakable.21 Worldwide experiences with 
village courts, truth commissions and international and domestic criminal 
tribunals testify to a border transcending inquiry into the intricacies of 
transitional justice. Such experiences are being portrayed, researched, 
communicated and compared, and they inform contemporary and future 
efforts. The boundaries between legal process and alternative or 
complementing forms of societal reconciliation have been shown to 
become increasingly porous in light of the overwhelming challenge to 
those engaged in transformative politics. It is against this background that 
the distinctive role of law warrants closer inspection. 
 
The following section of this paper will introduce the notion of 
transnational law [TL]. The subsequent parts will mobilize the concept and 
idea of transnational law to further explore the particular qualities of law’s 
capacity to address past injustice. The transnational perspective 
illuminates the impasses and blind spots that straight-forward legal 
approaches to righting past wrongs have in common. While a growing 
number of examples litigating for the compensation of historic crimes 
have become available over the past years22, truth commissions in post-
apartheid South-Africa or the Gacaca Courts in post-genocide Rwanda 
have been taken as powerful examples for alternative, or not exclusively 
law-based, routes to societal reconciliation. The development of 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Hunt, This Was Not Our War. Bosnian Women Reclaiming the Peace 
(Durham & London, Duke University Press, 2004); Uwe Timm, Am Beispiel meines 
Bruders (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2003), 91: “Die formelhafte Zusammenfassung der Eltern 
für das Geschehen war der Schicksalsschlag, ein Schicksal, worauf man persönlich 
keinen Einfluss hatte nehmen können. Den Jungen verloren und das Heim, das war einer 
der Sätze, mit denen man sich dem Nachdenken über die Gründe entzog. Man glaubte mit 
diesem Leid seinen Teil an der allgemeinen Sühne geleistet zu haben. Fürchterlich war 
eben alles, schon weil man selbst Opfer geworden war, Opfer eines unerklärlichen 
kollektiven Schicksals. Es waren dämonische Kräfte, die entweder außerhalb der 
Geschichte walteten ode Teil der menschlichen Natur waren, auf jeden Fall waren sie 
katastrophisch und unabwendbar. Entscheidungen, in die man sich nur schicken konnte. 
Und man fühlte sich vom Schicksal ungerecht behandelt.” 
22 Baumgartner, "Human Rights and Civil Litigation in United States Courts: The 
Holocaust-Era Cases" (2002) 80 Wash. U. L. Quarterly 835-854; Sarkin, "Reparation for 
Past Wrongs: Using Domestic Courts Around the World, Especially the United States, to 
Pursue Human Rights Claims" (2004) 32 Int. J. of Legal Information 426-460. 
 
 
8                                       CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 04 NO. 08 
 
alternatives proved to mature fast, and contemporary assessments reveal 
an increasingly refined focus of inquiry into the structure of mass crimes.23 
This refinement brings into play again the intricate relationship between 
legal process and other societal communications in post-conflict situations. 
The transnational law of post-conflict justice, then, unfolds less as a firmly 
established or contained body of law, but as an approach to structuring, 
with the help of legal norms and legal theory, processes of establishing 
accountability and legal responsibility. While contemporary acts of public 
remembrance might be accompanied with solemn declarations of 
‘historical’, ‘moral’, or ‘political’ responsibility24, legal responsibility 
seems much harder to attain. The definitive nature of legal responsibility 
seems to stand in stark contrast to the truth-finding efforts that are 
illustrated by the examples of South-Africa or Rwanda. With victims or 
their heirs ardently seeking their ‘day in court’, often many decades after 
the deed25, we are confronted with the challenge of designing the legal 
process in a manner that makes the practice of the law as it was known 
then visible and comprehensive while opening all possible ways of 
reconciliation today. The obstacles we face in the struggle for truth, for a 
better understanding and, ultimately, for forgiveness and forgetting26 must 
seem insurmountable in light of the arbitrary ways by which the rulers are 
separated from the ruled, the oppressors from the oppressed.27 “Because 
why should one assume that the end result of our accounting of the past 
                                                 
23 See, for example, Eltringham, Accounting for Horror: Post-Genocide Debates in 
Rwanda (London, Pluto Press, 2004). 
24 See, for example, the preamble to the Law establishing the compensation fund 
“Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future”, available at http://www.compensation-
for-forced-labour.org/pdf/Foundation_law_consolidated_E.pdf  
25 See hereto, for example, Neuborne, "Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-
Era Litigation in American Courts" (2002) 80 Washington University Law Quarterly 
795-834. 
26 See on the eminent role of forgetting, Margalit, The Ethics of Memory (Cambridge, 
MA/London, UK, Harvard University Press, 2002), Chapter 6: “Forgiving and 
Forgetting”. 
27 See hereto also the intriguing novel by Vladimir Nabokov, Bend Sinister (1947), 
republished by Vintage, 1990. I am indebted to my friend, Achim Podak, who guided me 
to this book. 




will move us any closer to a shared community rather than a break-down 
of community?”28 
 
It is here, however, where the eminent role of the law shines through, both 
with regard to its contribution to the preceding, unjust legal state as well as 
to its current role in shaping the communicative processes that unfold 
between the perpetrators and the victims during transition.29 In these 
highly contested moments of human conflict, the role of the law is itself 
questionable. Against this challenge, it shall be argued that the law plays a 
pivotal role in the process of societal post-conflict resolution. It does so by 
providing for rules and for language that contain and capture otherwise 
dispersed understandings and value assessments as they once were 
expressed through a norm, a ruling or legal terminology. While law can 
only observe the dichotomy between legal and illegal30, this reductionism 
is in fact able to capture the tensions that mark conflict communication in 
highly heterarchical societies. Post-conflict societies are of a dramatically 
fragile nature, and law assumes an organizing, reminding and guiding role 
in providing part of the communication structure of that society. As law is 
being put to an existential test in post-conflict situations, the very nature of 
law becomes questionable. It is in this light, then, that the inquiry into the 
law of post-conflict justice links ongoing searches of the role of law in 
society in different, yet comparable contexts. It is here where the idea of 
transnational law begins to unfold. 
 
 
                                                 
28 Christodoulidis, "Law's Immemorial", in Christodoulidis/Veitch (ed) Lethe's Law. 
Justice, Law and Ethics in Reconciliation (Oxford, UK/Portland, OR, Hart Publishing, 
2001), 207-227, at 221. 
29 See the novel by Achmat Dangor, Bitter Fruit (New York, Grove Atlantic, 2004), for a 
forceful illustration of the destructive impact of apartheid rule and human failings on 
humans even long after the fall of the oppressor regime. 
30 Luhmann, Law as a Social System (K.Ziegert transl., F.Kastner, D.Schiff, R.Nobles, 
R.Ziegert eds.) (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2004). 
 
 




III. THE MEANING OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
 
The first usage of the term transnational law [TL] continues to be disputed. 
While scholarship focused on the origins of the term for a long time, it has 
since become apparent that the real challenge of TL lies in its scope and 
conceptual aspiration.31 Within an interdisciplinary research agenda 
concerning the transformation of globalized law, TL offers itself as a 
supplementing and challenging category. Famously conceptualized in a 
series of lectures by Philip Jessup at Yale Law School in 195632, TL 
‘breaks the frames’ (Teubner) of traditional thinking about interstate 
relationships by pointing to the myriad forms of border-crossing relations 
among state and non-state actors.  
 
Jessup writes that he “shall use the term ‘transnational law’ to include all 
law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. 
Both public and private international law are included, as are other rules 
which do not wholly fit into such standard categories” (Jessup 1956: 2). 
When examining the inescapable ‘problem’ of people worldwide whose 
lives are ‘affected by rules’, Jessup points to the striking contingency by 
“which we attribute the label of ‘law’ to rules, norms or customs that 
govern various situations. It is the hallmark of TL to identify the hidden 
agendas and the blind spots of traditional regulatory law understandings. 
These are marked by clear assignments of law making authority to certain 
institutions on the one hand and a clear view of which norms of societal 
guidance are to be recognized as legal rules. In contrast, TL suggests a 
widening of the law making agenda and of our understanding of law as 
such. TL emerges from the increasingly interlocking spheres of societal 
norm production by public, official and private, in-official norm-setting 
agencies and actors.  
 
                                                 
31 Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956); Koh, 
"Transnational Legal Process" (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181-206. 
32 Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1956). 




Based on such an expanded understanding of law, TL has begun to reach 
deep into the heart of contemporary struggles over the role of law within 
dispersed and fragmented spaces and places of norm-production.33 TL 
reminds us of the very fragility and unattainedness of law. At the 
beginning of the 21st Century, we are still at a loss to identify a theory of 
law that would be subtle enough not to stifle emerging identities in a post-
colonial era34 while providing forms, fora and processes35 for the collision 
of discourses that mark post-metaphysical, legal thinking.36 TL is 
characterized by the emergence of norms that are no longer only generated 
by officially recognized sources of the law, but by a multitude of 
domestic, foreign and transnational norm-producers. This soft law 
constitutes a radical challenge to the state-based concept of law making 
that began to emerge in the 19th Century and that Max Weber, among 
others37, so powerfully captured as the rise of ‘modern law’.38 In contrast 
to law originating in an official constitutional order, soft law encompasses 
norms that are not attributable to an official author of statutory norms, and 
which do not appear directly enforceable by recognized, traditional means 
for the execution and application of legal rules. Instead, the soft law that is 
now emerging in many fields of regulatory law39 can be read as reactions 
                                                 
33 For the background of the distinction between spaces and places, see Sassen, 
Globalization and Its Discontents. Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money 
(New York, The New Press, 1998). 
34 See, for example, Lyon, "Discourse in Development: A Post-Colonial Theory 'Agenda' 
for the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights" (2003) 10 Journal of 
Gender, Social Policy & the Law http://ssrn.com/abstract=449301. 
35 Wiethölter, "Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law", in Teubner (ed) 
Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State (Berlin/New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 221-
249.  
36 Habermas, "Paradigms of Law" (1996) 17 Cardozo Law Review 771-784; Habermas, 
Between Facts and Norms [transl. William Rehg] (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1996). 
37 Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law [1936] (transl. Walter Moll, 
introd. Roscoe Pound) (New York, Russell & Russell Inc., 1962). 
38 Max Weber, Economy and Society: Part 2: Sociology of Law (1914), § 8: The formal 
qualities of modern law. 
39 See, e.g., Linda Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law, (Oxford, UK/Portland, 
OR, Hart Publishing, 2004); Blanpain/Colucci, The Globalization of Labour Standards. 
The Soft Law Track (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2004); Kirton/Trebilcock 
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against incapacities on the side of the state to proceed with adequate 
legislation. The proliferation of soft law thus offers examples of what 
anthropologists and legal sociologists have for a long time been describing 
as ‘legal pluralism’.40 It consists of expert standards, best practices, 
recommendations as well as principles and standards that can be seen as 
fertilizing ongoing searches for ‘better law’ without due regard to political 
or geographical borders. 
 
The relevance of TL to an understanding of contemporary regulatory 
challenges, however, is not restricted to the field of law as such. With 
regard to law, TL works itself like a drill through the few remaining 
security blankets hastily thrown over an impoverished and internally 
decaying conceptual body. But, beyond the study and practice of law, TL 




IV. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE 
 
In the context of and in concert with other complementing disciplines, TL 
is distinctly able to fertilize other conceptual searches while being 
                                                                                                                         
(Ed.), Hard Choices, Soft Law. Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and 
Social Governance (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004); Trubek/Trubek, "Hard and Soft Law in 
the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the Open Method of Coordination" (2005) 
11 European Law Journal 343-364; Zumbansen, "The Parallel Worlds of Corporate 
Governance and Labor Law" (2005) 13 Indiana Journal of Global Studies forthcoming. 
40 Moore, "Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate subject 
of study" (1973) 7 Law and Society Review 719-746; Griffiths, "What is Legal 
Pluralism?" (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1-55; Arthurs, 
Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century 
England (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1988), 50-88 (describing the persistence 
of legal pluralism in light of the ever stronger tendencies to centralize law through 
statutory law and official courts). For further assessments of legal pluralism, see Teubner, 
"'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralism in the World Society", in Teubner (ed) Global Law 
Without A State (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1997), 3-28, and Perez, "Normative Creativity 
and Global Legal Pluralism: Reflections on the Democratic Critique of Transnational 
Law" (2003) 10 Indiana Journal of Global Studies 25-64. 




informed by the transformations occurring within these disciplines. As 
much as TL has been shown to lay bare the raw and vulnerable 
foundations of law in all of its absurd contingency41 and utopian 
aspiration, while being based in social practice administered with 
denominational authority42, law itself reaches out to disciplines such as 
history, cultural studies and anthropology to tell its own story. With legal 
history taking form as a transnational enterprise43, it can build on and learn 
from the work being done by historians and cultural studies scholars. The 
emergence of transnational history gives overwhelming testimony of a 
border-crossing inquiry into the legality-legitimacy narratives of state and 
nation building. Formerly conceived and framed in discrete fashions, 
domestic/national historical narratives reveal and communicate common 
experiences and semantic appropriations in comparative, transnational and 
global perspective.44  
 
The Law of post-conflict justice shifts between the unattainable poles of 
retribution and reconciliation, between persecution and justice, between 
                                                 
41 See the discussion of law in Jean Anouilh, Antigone (London, UK, Methuen, 2000), 
transl. by Barbara Trans, edited by Ted Freeman. 
42 Moore, "Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate subject 
of study" (1973) 7 Law and Society Review 719-746; Bourdieu, "The Force of Law: 
Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field" (1987) 38 Hastings Law Journal 805-813; 
Derrida, "Force of law" (1990) 11 Cardozo Law Review 919-1045; hereto see also the 
Special Issue of German Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1 January 2005), available at: 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues_archive.php. 
43 Merry, "Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes" (1992) 21 Annual Review 
of Anthropology 357-379; Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005); see the contributions 
to Geschichte-transnational, http://geschichte-transnational.clio-
online.net/transnat.asp?lang=en . 
44 Bright/Geyer, "World History in a Global Age" (1995) 100 American Historical 
Review 1034-1060; Bentley, "Cross-Cultural Interaction and Periodization in World 
History" (1996) 101 American Historical Review 749-770; Middell, "Kulturtransfer und 
Historische Komparatistik - Thesen zu ihrem Verhältnis" (2000) 10 Comparativ 7-41; 
Conrad/Osterhammel (Ed.), Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der Welt 
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remembrance and forgetfulness.45 It is destined and cursed to do so while 
its very foundations are exposed in its inadequacy at every turn. “Law is 
caught between the past and the future, between backward-looking and 
forward-looking, between retrospective and prospective, between the 
individual and the collective.”46 Experiences with alternative routes to 
societal reconciliation in past years have shown how very fragile and in 
many ways ill-suited the legal apparatus is in the context of post-conflict 
reconstruction. This moment shows the co-existing poles of law, its 
utopia, reconciliation and forgiving on the one hand and revolution and 
retribution on the other. Law and the functions it serves do not exist 
outside of human imagination, but law is not merely the result of human 
action. Instead, it is through its function that we can begin to understand 
the unique quality of law. As developed by the German sociologist and 
legal theorist, Niklas Luhmann, law serves primarily to stabilize 
expectations. It does so by producing rules that preserve the identification 
of something as “legal” over time and therefore are available for an 
assessment at a later point in time. The time-binding quality of law is thus 
the basis and the core of Luhmann’s legal theory. By “moving the problem 
to the temporal dimension [w]e can see the social meaning of law in the 
fact that there are social consequences if expectations can be secured as 
stable expectations over time.”47 
 
The law of post-conflict justice can be observed to provide exactly that. It 
serves to establish a framework for the stabilization of societal 
expectations. Just which law is most adequate to guide this process 
remains a great challenge. The very connectedness of the assessment of 
past injustice with the normative architecture of a new legal order makes it 
evident that often, in the application of post-conflict justice, it is not 
merely a specific statute or practice on trial, but a whole system. Taking 
                                                 
45 Adler/Zumbansen, "The Forgetfulness of Noblesse: A Critique of the German 
Foundation Law Compensating Slave and Forced Laborers of the Third Reich" (2002) 39 
Harvard Journal on Legislation [and in: Zwangsarbeit im Dritten Reich: Erinnerung und 
Verantwortung / NS Forced Labor: Remembrance and Responsibility 333 (P. Zumbansen 
ed. 2002)] 1-61.  
46 Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2000), 6. 
47 Luhmann, Law as a Social System (K.Ziegert transl., F.Kastner, D.Schiff, R.Nobles, 
R.Ziegert eds.) (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2004), 143. 




this into consideration, the realm of questions to be addressed is far greater 
than any piece-meal approach to remedying a wrong would ever entail.48 
Recent inquiries into the specific role of constitution-making and of 
constitutional law in the transitional process have begun to shed some light 
on the intricate dynamics of legal norms in post-conflict and other 
transitional contexts.49 But, while the creation of constitutional bodies 
bears the insigna of a fresh start, of new beginnings50, the big bang and 
bright lights of constitution making are only too likely to render us deaf 
and blind to the constant struggle for law’s dominion in the every day 
workings of established legal orders.51 The particular attention received by 
constitutional processes in periods of transition leads to an isolation of 
constitutional law and constitution making from the legal order in general. 
By that, the legal order becomes reified as something that functions 
smoothly and is in no further need of critical assessment. The exposition 
of constitutional moments in transition periods functions to cast a shadow 
on the persisting legitimacy challenges that are inherent to the legal order 
as such.52 Constitutional beginnings, then, share a decisive characteristic 
                                                 
48 See hereto Thomas W. Pogge, Historical Wrongs. The Two Other Domains, in Lukas 
Meyer ed., Justice in Time. Responding to Historical Injustice (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
2004), 117-134, highlighting the way in which “past injustice […] can affect present 
moral reasons for action.” (117) 
49 See Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism, and South-Africa's Political 
Reconstruction (Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2000); Walker, "The Idea 
of Constitutional Pluralism" (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 317-359; see in this context 
the intriguing, comparative analysis by Gross, "Reconciliation in South Africa" (2004) 40 
Stanf. J. Int'l L. 40-107 for South-Africa and Israel and Mattias Kumm, “The Idea of 
Constitutional Patriotism and its Implications for the Role and Structure of European 
Legal History”, (2005) 6 German Law Journal 319. 
50 See the careful assessment by Dupré, Importing the Law in Post-communist 
Transitions, The Hungarian Constitutional Court and the Right to Human Dignity 
(Oxford, UK/Portland, OR, Hart Publishing, 2003), hereto also Renata Uitz, in (2005) 
Annual of German & European Law Vol. 2 (Miller & Zumbansen eds., Oxford/New 
York, Berghahn Books, 2005), forthcoming. 
51 Gross, “Reconciliation in South Africa”, at 51. 
52 See only Koskenniemi, "'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much'. Kosovo, and the Turn to 
Ethics in International Law" (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 159-175; Orford, “Muscular 
Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of Humanitarian Intervention”, (1999) 10 
European Journal of International Law [EJIL] 679-711, at 689-692. 
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with other narratives of new (legal) orders which we often find presented 
as creating a forum and framework for an untainted legitimacy of societal 
order through law.53 Eventually, the pomp and glory of constitutional talk 
dissociates the fragile and constantly endangered emergence of a legal 
order from a long-standing critique of law. It is against this background, 
that we ought to reflect on the role that law can play in transition periods: 
not isolated and put on a podium of the world’s fleeting attention and 
excitement, but embedded in a continuing critique of the force and 
weakness of legal norms. 
 
 
V. REMEMBRANCE AND UTOPIA IN LAW 
 
The reformation and its ensuing energies as well as the subsequent 
bourgeois revolutions of early modernity are characterized by the 
emergence of the individual subject as the centre of social and political 
activity. Henceforth,it has been against the individual that order and its 
legitimacy claims are measured. To the degree in which they are found to 
be foul and rotten, they are doomed and will be swept away: with the 
dawn of modernity, man begins to order his world in time. Human history 
in search of direction, in the meantime unfolding possibilities of 
probability and prudence.54 (I’m not sure I understand this sentence) 
Religious prophecy is replaced by supposedly rationalist forecast, but this 
forecast radiates a sense of stability similar to that which before emanated 
from eschatologic trust in providence or the felt threat of demise. In the 
interaction between the state and individual, now both matured, the 
knoweldge of the changeability of things is foundational in the state’s 
creation of its own legitmacy grounds. Time’s horizon is no longer as open 
                                                 
53 For a critique, see Zumbansen, "Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and 
Transnational Law" (2002a) 8 European Law Journal 400-432; Zumbansen, "Sustaining 
Paradox Boundaries: Perspectives on the Internal Affairs in Domestic and International 
Law" (2004a) 15 European Journal of International Law [EJIL] 197-211. 
54 Koselleck, "Vergangene Zukunft der frühen Neuzeit (1968)" (1979) ders., Vergangene 
Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten (zuerst erschienen in Epirrhosis. Festgabe 
für Carl Schmitt, hrsg. v. Barion, Böckenförde, Forsthoff, Weber, Bd. 2, 549-566 17-37; 
Koselleck, "Begriffsgeschichte und Sozialgeschichte (1972)" (1979) in: id., Vergangene 
Zukunft (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1979) 107-129. 




as it used to be. Adopting the role of interpretor and direction-setter the 
state defines progression into a now unknown and final, but also 
manageable future.This rupture, however, is not yet absolute. Eschatology 
remains strong in the background and the consciousness of one’s time 
future is a strange but courageous mix of politics and prophecy.55 Within 
this rationalist philosophy of progress we can see rationalist future 
prognostics unfolding. These are in turn still dominated by an important 
incorporation of the past into the imagery of the future. The events that are 
expected within the political horizon of historical development are seen as 
reoccurring and reappearing events, repeating themselves instead of being 
grand beginnings or last ends. From this perspective, the future that is 
actually envisioned for the state is simultaneously present in the past, the 
realm of political action contemporaneously occupied as well as 
confined.56 Time is important, because with ever more rapid sequences of 
events, brought about by deliberate human action and understood as such, 
the “realms of experience” (Erfahrungsräume) shrink, and the experience 
of the present falls victim to this unforeseeability in a way that makes the 
present’s experience of time evade into the future.57 Presence can no 
longer experience itself as presence but is now forced to resort to its own 
historio-philosophical assumption (selbstbezogene 
geschichtsphilosophische Einholung). Parallelly, the semantics used to 
describe these both opened and closed spheres of possibilities are 
changing as well: Utopia can no longer characterize the experience 
horizon of political thinking, only Revolution.58 Yet, it is felt that 
revolution may put an absolute end to everything. In this respect 
revolution is always confronted with reaction59 and, in turn, every future 
oriented action is of a political nature. While utopia and revolution are 
hence distinguishable by the absence (utopia) and presence (revolution) of 
                                                 
55 Koselleck, 33. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Koselleck, "'Erfahrungsraum' und 'Erfahrungshorizont' - zwei historische Kategorien 
(1975)" (1979) in: id., Vergangene Zukunft (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt) 349-375  
58 Niklas Luhmann, Die Politik der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 2000), 208: „Die 
Befürworter lernen, daß Revolution ein langfristiger Prozeß ist, die Gegner sehen 
Revolution als Folge falscher Ideen.“ 
59 Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft, 34-5 
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deliberate human action and by the belief that change can be brought 
about by abruptly ending traditional ways, usually under the signum of 
eventual responsibility, legal practicioners of post-conflict justice are 
operating somewhere in between the horizons of utopia and revolution. 
 
 
VI. THE CHANGING FACE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE LAW OF OCCUPATION 
 
The transnational perspective can further illuminate the challenge to law 
and societal memory that we find in various post-conflict situations around 
the world. These situations can be seen as entering the legal imagination 
against the background of a dramatically enlarged and yet fragmented and 
incoherent human rights agenda. While the scandalization of human rights 
violations drives legal efforts to address wrongdoings beyond 
jurisdictional boundaries60, we still seem far away from a comprehensive 
human rights regime. However, such a legal order might not even be 
desired in light of the different claims connected to the expansion of 
human rights. And yet, it is from this ongoing search for a better law, that 
the transnational law of post-conflict justice takes its cue. It develops in 
the light of a greater global awareness of the need for a human rights 
agenda and enters existing legal fields that are themselves undergoing 
dramatic changes.61 Because it is dramitically intertwined with ongoing 
legal reforms in post-conflict situations, the law of occupation vividly 
                                                 
60 Scott, "Translating Torture into Transnational Tort: Conceptual Divides in the Debate 
on Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Harms", in Scott (ed) Torture as Tort 
(Portland, OR/Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001), 45-63; Scott/Wai, "Transnational 
Governance of Corporate Conduct through the Migration of Human Rights Norms: The 
Potential of Transnational "Private" Litigation", in Joerges/Sand/Teubner (ed) 
Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Oxford/Portland, OR, Hart Publishing, 
2004), 287-319; Zumbansen, "Beyond Territoriality: The Case of Transnational Human 
Rights Litigation", in: ConWEB Paper 4/2005, available at: 
http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesandPhilosophy/Resear
ch/PaperSeries/ConWEBPapers/.  
61 Bhuta, "The Antinomies of Transformative Occupation" (2005) 16 European Journal of 
International Law [EJIL] 721-740. 




reflects the changed legal agenda.Its recent past points to a much more 
encompassing agenda of reconstruction and nation-building.62 
 
The future orientated perspective of the law of occupation has transformed 
this body of law from one applicable to post-military situations of 
desirably brief occupation and focussed on peace and sanitary stability to 
an encompassing legal agenda aiming at administrative reconstruction and 
state-building. This transformation is nowhere more visible than in the 
current situation in Iraq. The present state of the law of occupation in Iraq 
finds a distinctive expression in the United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 1483, 1546 and in the letter by the US’ and the UK’s 
permanent representative Security Council of 8 May 2003.63 In this letter, 
both leaders were explicitly outspoken with regard to the reconstructive 
efforts that the occupiers ought to undertake64, and it is this mandate that 
the Security Council Resolution adopted almost verbatim in UNSC 
Resolution 1483. 
 
The transformation of the international law of occupation is closely linked 
to changes in public international law at large. While this in itself seems 
obvious, the actual impact is far less so.65 Few observers of the 
international legal scene today would be willing to testify to its simple 
state of development. Instead, international law ranges among the most 
contested of legal areas at this time. Its present situation, characterized by 
                                                 
62 See for example the remarkable, new introduction to Eyal Benvenisti, The 
International Law of Occupation (Oxford, UK/Princeton, NY, Princeton University 
Press, 2004). 
63 S/2003/538, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document 
/2003/0608usukletter.htm  
64 Id.: “The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners are facilitating the 
establishment of representative institutions of government, and providing for the 
responsible administration of the Iraqi financial sector, for humanitarian relief, for 
economic reconstruction, for the transparent operation and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure 
and natural resources, and for the progressive transfer of administrative responsibilities to 
such representative institutions of government, as appropriate. Our goal is to transfer 
responsibility for administration to representative Iraqi authorities as early as possible.” 
65 See Ian Williams, “Will International Law Shape Occupation, or the Occupation Shape 
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a self-understanding still seeking the beginnings of its current disarray66, 
offers much testimony of the seemingly eternal juxtaposition of 
international law and politics, of universalism and hegemony. But, at the 
same time, international law has become so much more reflexive, that its 
period of untiring self-questioning and self-reassuring can now safely be 
declared to be past. Instead, international law’s contemporary soul-
searching calls for for an extended exploration of the discipline’s young, 
but troubled history with its increased meeting-points and soulmateships 
with inquiries such as cultural studies, international regime studies, legal 
theory and transnational law, literary theory and transnational history.67 At 
present, however, the noises of the “real”68 are louder than the suggestions 
of the “social”.69 Current assessments of international law still struggle 
with old demons of inferiority and irrelevance in the ugly face of 
international politics, imperialism and hegemony, but they also reach out 
to encompass the particular nature of international law.70 The latter we can 
only begin to understand when reflecting on the very nature of the 
international order on the one hand, and of our understanding of law and 
legal regulation on the other. Our assessment of the role of law in the 
dynamic and contested international order depends on our understanding 
of this order, but there is no simple causal relationship between the social 
reality and the legal order. Instead, our inquiries into the structure of the 
                                                 
66 See Michael Byers, Introduction: The complexities of foundational change, in 
Byers/Nolte (Ed.), United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-22. 
67 Koskenniemi, "International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal" (2005) 
16 European Journal of International Law [EJIL] 113-124; for further references, see 
Zumbansen, "Transnational Law", in Smits (ed) Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 
Edward Elgar, 2006), forthcoming. 
68 Zižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related 
Dates (New York, Verso, 2002). 
69 Kennedy, "Two Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-1968" (2003) 36 
Suffolk L. Rev. 631-679; Kerry Rittich,“The Future of Law and Development: Second 
Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social”, (2004) 26 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 199-243. 
70 Krisch, "International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of 
the International Legal Order" (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law [EJIL] 
369-408. 




international order proceed in relative autonomy from the progress made 
in legal theory with regard to developing an international law for the 
global age.71 Where our understanding of law passess from first 
assessments of violence (Bodin, Hobbes) on to formalization (Kelsen) to 
realism (Llewellyn) or to downfall (Schmitt), to reassment (Kelsen, Hart, 
Fuller, Dworkin) on to fragmentation and dispersement (Teubner, Sousa 
Santos), the legal theory of international law has undergone dramatic 
changes, while international law itself has assumed a contested form that 
today differs much from earlier challenges of its weakness. At present, 
International Law must remember and assess the combination of realism 
and utopia in its foundational myths only in the context of developments 
in other fields of regulatory law where changing modes of norm-creation 
have long been questioning dearly-held beliefs in public-private 
distinctions of political, legitimate rule creation on the one hand and 
private, market-based profit seeking on the other.72 
 
The continuing, contested nature of international law illustrates particular 
challenges to the law in post-conflict situations. There is no well-
contained, settled consensus on the scope and content of the international 
law of occupation, nor is there a ready-to-wear, normative outfit worn by 
the international law of post-conflict justice. Instead, the transnational 
dimension in which these bodies of law interact, collide and fuse with 
ongoing searches for better law and better norms of nation-building and 
societal reconciliation in different parts of the world demonstrates the 
degree to which a transnational law of post-conflict justice is undercutting, 
accompanying and complementing the public international law of 
occupation in distinct ways. As the nation-state alone ceases to provide the 
context in which legal experiments unfold, norms are emerging in a de-
territorialized sphere of world society. As narratives of post-conflict 
situations and the role of law and alternative ordering mechanisms 
continue to be developed and applied, we learn much about the 
                                                 
71 Luhmann, Law as a Social System (K.Ziegert transl., F.Kastner, D.Schiff, R.Nobles, 
R.Ziegert eds.) (Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 2004), chapter 12. 
72 Zumbansen, "Sustaining Paradox Boundaries: Perspectives on the Internal Affairs in 
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approximation of formerly isolated and distant regulatory experiments.73 
The recognizance or execution of political will in the task of 
reconstructing a state after a massive and encompassing change brings to 
the fore every foundational myth that regularly appears in the context of 
nation-building. But so much more is produced by that process, as the law 
and politics of reconstruction collide with demands for societal 
reconciliation and a future looking, reconstructive agenda based on 
independent, self-governing terms. The law of post-conflict justice 
collides head-on with the programs and ideologies of “law and 
development.”74 This conflict between shock programs and carefully, 
implemented, reconstructive and learning modes75 seems to characterize 
the options available to international consultants and legal policy 
programmers. Which model of the state, of the market, of society will 
likely underlie and guide the reconstructive efforts that depend on the 
financial and infrastructure support by the international community? 
 
In seeking a tentative answer to this question, we are caught between 
skepticsm and enthusiasm as to what conceptions of government, 
governance, democracy, social welfare and private autonomy will likely 
evolve from this inquiry. Realizing that path-dependent trajectories of 
capitalist markets and social welfare regimes reflect - to a certain degree - 
comparative institutional advantages, our perception can no longer remain 
blind to the intricate causation chains between national reform politics and 
impacts of globalized markets. In light of the often repeated complaint of 
what globalization actually stands for and whether, for example, 
globalization has caused immensive stress on welfare states or whether 
structural changes within these states instead promoted and fueled certain 
globalization phenomena, we ought to take seriously the growing 
awareness within many international-oriented disciplines regarding the 
                                                 
73 See, for a powerful illustration, Swanee Hunt, This Was Not Our War. Bosnian Women 
Reclaiming the Peace (Durham & London, Duke University Press, 2004), Chesterman, 
You, The People, supra, 180-182. 
74 Posner, "Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development" (1998) 13 The 
World Bank Research Observer 1-11, on the one hand, and Rittich, Recharacterizing 
Restructuring. Law, Distribution and Gender in Market Reform (The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2002), on the other. 
75 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (1999). 




limits and constraints of their traditional analytical instruments. While law 
needs to embrace the sociological research that nourishes the phenomena 
of legal pluralism, experimental law making and public-private 
governance mixes76, we see a similiar eyeopening within the discipline 
political science as it moves from a state oriented international relations 
approach via focussing on international regimes towards increased 
research of ever more flexible forms of governance. Likewise we see a 
sudden awakening within historical research to the phenomena of 
“transnationalism” which to us, however, can be no less than disturbing. 
If, in law, we proceed onwards in the firm belief that for the purpose of 
reassurance we can always turn back to law’s history, to its tracks of 
development and even to its cross roads and turning points, it is quite 
unsettling to have to realize that the historian herself will have had to first 
develop her own adequate analytical approach before being able to firmly 
guide us. We can recognize and should welcome this insecurity internal to 
private and public international law, embracing it in the context of 
questions that touch upon emerging forms of international governance that 
are quite intricately related to changes within national legal orders. For the 
participants on both ends of the debate, the transnationalist and the 
traditionalist, there is no simple home to be found yet, no ready made bed 
to lie in anymore. While the transnationalist will, sooner or later, be 
confronted with a struggle for legitimacy mirrored so pointedly in the 
history of our national legal and political orders, the traditionalist also can 
no longer draw the blinds in order to resort to old ways. The nation state 
and its legal order have undergone radical changes that prompt more 
questions than are answers avalaible. Radical changes in public 
administrative practice, the inescable and ever-recurring necessity of 
speculative policy choices and the ensuing reflexive forms of law making 
in a dense public-private mix, these features prompt closer inspection – 
but they do not resemble the quiet home that some traditionalists want to 
return to. From this follows that both perspectives, the transnational and 
the traditional one, are valid and interdependent. In fact, in some sense, we 
can either be both or none at all. 
 
 
                                                 
76 See the masterful study by Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal 
Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1988). 
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VII. PAST AND FUTURE 
 
“Ohne gemeinsame Begriffe gibt es keine Gesellschaft, 
vor allem keine politische Handlungseinheit. ”77 
 
“Aus den Horizonten normativer und formativer 
Wertsetzungen kommen wir nicht heraus. ”78 
 
At this point, it becomes very clear that any approach to ‘working through 
the past’79 creates linkages between the past and the future. “We cannot 
ask the historians, as Ranke did, to tell us ‘wie es wirklich gewesen ist’. 
Instead, history is a reflection on the past from the present, and we must be 
aware that the common identities that we forge and the narratives that we 
live with emerge from processes of remembering and forgetting.”80 
Indeed, the deciphering of the differently shaded heritages and legacies of 
emerging polities – such as post-conflict, transitional societies as well as, 
for example, the European Union – unveils the inseparability of an 
assessment of the past from the design of the future.81 The law’s role in 
this process of to and fro is crucial as it will aid in selecting, thereby 
illuminating as well as silencing elements of the past, and even complete 
                                                 
77 Koselleck, Begriffsgeschichte und Sozialgeschichte, 108 (“Without common 
terminology, there is not society, and above all no unity for political action”) 
78 J.Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis (Munich, Beck, 2nd ed., 1992) 129 (“We cannot 
escape the horizons of normative and formative value assessments.”) 
79 Adorno chose the term, Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit, to address the problems 
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pasts.82 And, here we apparently end back where we started. Law appears 
as a salvaging force that can guide us out of the dark by its very appeal to 
legitimacy. But, that the law has never been our own, is the tragic lesson 
learned by the man waiting before the gates of the law as well as by all the 
others that wait for law’s healing hand.83 
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